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NOTES
THE NEW FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND
EXPANDED ANTI-RETALIATION
PROTECTIONS FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS
CREATED BY SECTION 922 OF THE DODDFRANK ACT: ACTUAL PROGRESS OR JUST
POLITICS?
INTRODUCTION
In early December 2008, Bernie Madoff was arrested for allegedly
orchestrating a $50 billion Ponzi scheme.1 This news shocked everyone,
and many wondered how a fraud of such magnitude could go without being
detected for so long.2 In the days following Bernie Madoff’s arrest, the
initial shock grew into anger as the public learned that the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC or the Agency) had been warned numerous
times that Madoff was committing fraud.3
One person in particular, Harry Markopolos, warned the SEC about
Madoff five times.4 Markopolos, now an independent certified fraud
examiner, first heard of Madoff while working at a rival firm.5 After
conducting research on the trading strategy that Madoff claimed he used,
Markopolos became convinced that Madoff’s returns were not real. In 2005,
he sent a detailed letter to the SEC explaining why he thought “Madoff

1. See United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244, 244 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Ponzi
Schemes – Frequently Asked Questions, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (last visited
Aug. 30, 2011). The SEC defines Ponzi scheme as:
[A]n investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing
investors from funds contributed by new investors. Ponzi scheme organizers often
solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate
high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the fraudsters focus on
attracting new money to make promised payments to earlier-stage investors and to use
for personal expenses, instead of engaging in any legitimate investment activity.
Id.

2. See, e.g., Terry Keenan, This Ponzi Scheme is Crème de la Crème, N.Y. POST, Dec. 14,
2008, at 35.
3. See, e.g., Amir Efrati, Tom Lauricella & Dionne Searcey, Top Broker Accused of $50
Billion Fraud Sons Turned in Madoff After He Allegedly Told Them His Investment-Advisory
Business for the Wealthy Was ‘Giant Ponzi Scheme,’ WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2008, at A.1.
4. Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enter. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
111th Cong. 5 (2009) [hereinafter Madoff Hearing] (statement of Harry Markopolos, CFA, CFE,
Chartered Fin. Analyst and Certified Fraud Examiner).
5. See id. at 5, 27, 106–07.
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Securities [was] the world’s largest Ponzi Scheme.”6 Four years later, on
February 4, 2009, Markopolos testified before the Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises regarding the
7
failure of the SEC to detect Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. During his testimony,
Markopolos presented recommendations to correct the internal problems of
the SEC.8 Additionally, he recommended the creation of “a whistleblower
program to compensate people from within the industry who know about . .
. fraud . . . to step forward.”9
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act).10
After years of being ignored, it seems that Markopolos’s advice was finally
followed: Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a financial incentive
for persons to report fraud to the SEC.11
Offering financial incentives for whistleblowers who aid the SEC in
detecting corporate and securities fraud is not a new approach.12 Prior to the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC had a bounty program for
informants who provided the SEC with tips regarding insider trading.13 That
program was created pursuant to the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), which was enacted in response to the
publicity of several high-profile insider trading schemes.14 The Dodd-Frank
6. Letter from Harry Markopolos, CFA, CFE, Chartered Fin. Analyst and Certified Fraud
Examiner, to the SEC (Nov. 7, 2005), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer
.aspx?fid=54539da2-994e-43b5-b271-19fbb7e723e3.
7. Madoff Hearing, supra note 4, at 5.
8. Id. at 5–8.
9. Id. at 42.
10. President Barack H. Obama, Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act
[hereinafter Remarks].
11. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6 (2010)).
12. The SEC has had a reward program for insider trading informants since 1989. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 34-26994, 43 SEC DOCKET 1963, 1964 (June 30,
1989) [hereinafter Applications for Bounty Awards]. Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 created anti-retaliation protections for employees of public companies who reported
fraudulent activity by their employers to the SEC. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley
Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002)).
Lastly, many scholarly articles have called for additional incentives and protections for those who
provide tips to the SEC and other agencies. See Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales,
Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2251 (Dec. 2010); Beverley H.
Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection Under Sarbanes-Oxley: A
Proposal for Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2007); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the
Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 183,
185–88 (2007).
13. See generally Applications for Bounty Awards, supra note 12 (discussing the bounty
program).
14. See, e.g., Neil V. Shah, Note, Section 20A and the Struggle for Coherence, Meaning, and
Fundamental Fairness in the Express Right of Action for Contemporaneous Insider Trading
Liability, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 791, 791–92 (2009).
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Act also expands the anti-retaliation protections for whistleblowers that
were created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) which was enacted
in response to several high-profile corporate frauds, including Enron,15
WorldCom,16 and Tyco.17
This note examines the SEC’s previous whistleblower reward program
and the prior anti-retaliation protections offered by SOX, and argues that
the Dodd-Frank Act’s financial incentives and anti-retaliation protections
for whistleblowers do not address the SEC’s internal problems, and
therefore, seem to be more of a political reaction than meaningful measures
to increase the SEC’s ability to detect fraud. In Part I, this note will first
discuss the role of whistleblowers in detecting corporate fraud. Then, Part II
will examine the circumstances that led to the enactment of the ITSFEA,
the specifics of the whistleblower program that it created at the SEC, and
the outcome of this program. Next, the circumstances that led to the
enactment of SOX, the specifics of the anti-retaliation protections created
by SOX, and the effect of these protections will be explored in Part III. Part
IV will analyze the circumstances that led to the enactment of the DoddFrank Act, the specifics of the new whistleblower anti-retaliation
protections, the financial incentives created by this law, and what the SEC
is doing to implement the new program. Pulling together the information
put forth in previous sections, Part V will highlight the trend of Congress
and the SEC to reform the laws after a recession and revelation of highprofile fraud. Part VI argues that the SEC was not lacking tips from
whistleblowers, but rather it was the SEC’s internal problems that
weakened its ability to detect fraud. Finally, Part VII suggests that instead
of creating the new whistleblower program, the SEC should have focused
on creating better internal procedures for reviewing external tips and
15. Enron was an American energy trading company that engaged in accounting fraud.
Enron’s accounting practices falsely inflated the company’s revenues by hiding large liabilities.
When the company could no longer continue this practice, it was forced to file for Chapter 11. See
Special Report: Corporate America’s Woes, Continued – Enron: One Year On, THE ECONOMIST,
Nov. 30, 2002, at 69. Enron’s accounting scandal, in part, led to the enactment of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002. See, e.g., Lisa H. Nicholson, The Culture of Under-Enforcement: Buried
Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Corporate Pirate, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 321, 321–25
(2007).
16. WorldCom was a large American telecommunications firm that committed massive
accounting fraud, causing the company to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on July 21, 2002. At the
time, it was the largest bankruptcy in American history. WorldCom’s Bankruptcy Mess, THE
ECONOMIST, July 22, 2002, at 1. WorldCom’s accounting scandal contributed to the decision to
enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See, e.g., Nicholson, supra note 15, at 321–25.
17. Tyco’s Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer were both found guilty of
“grand larceny and conspiracy, falsifying business records and violating general business law,”
after being accused of using corporate funds for their personal use and misrepresenting the
company’s financial situation. See Krysten Crawford, Ex-Tyco CEO Kozlowski Found Guilty:
Second Trial Ends in Guilty Verdicts for Former Tyco Chief and the Company’s Ex-CFO Swartz,
CNNMONEY.COM (June 21, 2005), http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/17/news/newsmakers/tyco
_trialoutcome/index.htm. The Tyco scandal contributed to the government’s decision to enact the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See, e.g., Nicholson, supra note 15, at 321–25.
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implementing technology that would make the Agency more proactive in
detecting fraud.
I. THE ROLE OF A WHISTLEBLOWER IN DETECTING
CORPORATE AND SECURITIES FRAUD
Corporate fraud often refers to schemes designed and carried out by
corporate officers or employees in order to conceal the actual financial
condition of the corporation from the public.18 Securities fraud includes
schemes involving false or misleading information about securities and
potential returns in order to attract investors.19 Both crimes cause harm to
the individuals who are directly affected, and to society, since they diminish
trust.20
The deceptive and secretive nature of corporate and securities fraud
makes them difficult to detect, especially for people who do not have access
to a company’s internal files.21 Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, and Luigi
Zingales conducted a study of 216 alleged fraud cases against U.S.
22
corporations from 1996 to 2004, and “attribute[d] 34% of the fraud
detections to internal governance . . . .”23 While internal governance
detected more fraud than any other specific factor in the study, about 66%
of cases were detected by those outside of the corporation—the SEC (7%),
employees (17%), non-financial market regulatory organizations (13%), the
media (13%), auditors (10%), equity holders (3%), and private parties who
18. Reports & Publications, FBI, 2009 Financial Crimes Report (Oct. 1, 2008–Sept. 30, 2009),
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2009/.
19. Id. Securities fraud is not limited to these schemes. Other types of securities fraud include
insider trading, broker embezzlement, and late-day trading. Id.
20. See generally Nicholson, supra note 15, at 328–31 (discussing white-collar criminals).
21. See Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 12, at 2214.
22. Dyck, Morse, and Zingales relied on data collected by the Stanford Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse collection. This database includes all suits filed against U.S. firms for corporate
fraud pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 between
1996–2004. To exclude frivolous cases from the database, Dyck, Morse, and Zingales applied the
following six filters: (1) they only included alleged frauds that ended after the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was enacted; (2) only large domestic firms were included; (3) they
excluded all cases that were dismissed; (4) for cases that were settled, only those cases that were
settled for more than $3 million were included; (5) for cases that were settled for more than $3
million, those that seemed to be settled to avoid negative publicity were also eliminated; and (6)
only frauds that involved firm management were included. As a result, the study included 216
cases of alleged fraud. Id. at 2217–18. In order to determine who brought the claim, Dyck, Morse,
and Zingales searched Factiva to collect and code data from articles. Id. at 2218–21. One bias that
was noted was that early detected frauds were not included in the sample since this information
was not publicly available. Id. at 2224. The main goal of the study, however, was to find “the most
effective external mechanisms that help detect corporate fraud when there is a failure of internal
mechanisms.” Id. The main finding of the study was that detecting fraud often depends on a “wide
range of (often improbable) actors.” Id. at 2251. The study also found that the existing incentives
for certain whistleblowers, such as employees, were weak. Id. Finally, the authors suggested that
monetary incentives might have a significant role in promoting whistle-blowing. Id.
23. Id. at 2224–25 (“We identify a case as one of internal governance when the revealer of
fraud is firm management . . . or the board of directors.”).

2011]

Whistleblower Incentives & Expanded Protections

191

pursued litigation (3%).24 Therefore, the most important finding of their
study25 is that in most cases, the detection of fraud occurs through “a
complex web of market actors that complement each other.”26 The goal of
whistleblower legislation has been to encourage information sharing across
this “web,” particularly between insiders and the government. This has been
done using a variety of mechanisms, including offering whistleblowers
protection from retaliation and monetary incentives.27
II. INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD
ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988 (ITSFEA)
The first program that offered financial incentives for informants to the
SEC was created by the ITSFEA,28 and implemented by the SEC in 1989.29
As discussed below, this statute was enacted in response to the increase of
high-profile insider trading cases during the mid-1980s.30 As such, the
program was limited to informants of insider trading.31 Although it seemed
promising when it was first implemented, the program quickly became
dormant.32
A. CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO THE CREATION OF THE LAW
The early 1980s were marked by a severe recession that caused
economic uncertainty for many.33 In response to the recession, the White
House and Congress enacted policies of deregulation with the hope of
spurring the economy.34 Around the same time, however, several highprofile insider trading scandals, including some involving White House
administration officials and some of the most well-known men in the
financial industry, came to light.35 Perhaps the biggest scandal of the decade
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 2214, 2225.
Id. at 2251.
Id.
See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness
of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151,
1153 (2010).
28. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 3,
102 Stat. 4677, 4679 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–1 (1988)) amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 923(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1849–50 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 78u–6 (2010)).
29. See Applications for Bounty Awards, supra note 12.
30. Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s,
82 IND. L.J. 575, 583 (2007).
31. See Applications for Bounty Awards, supra note 12, at 1964–65.
32. See Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and
Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1165 (1999); SEC,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, No. 474, ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY PROGRAM
(2010) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT].
33. See Joo, supra note 30, at 576.
34. See id.
35. Id.
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involved Ivan Boesky, “a world-class arbitrageur” who used insider
information from Dennis Levine, a well-known merger specialist, to profit
from corporate takeovers.36 These scandals caused many to believe that
such behavior was commonplace.37 In response to the scandals, public
anxiety about the economy, and perhaps to legitimize itself, Congress
passed the ITSFEA.38
B. THE ITSFEA AND THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FOR
INSIDER TRADING
The ITSFEA expanded the scope of the existing laws that regulated
insider trading: Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
Exchange Act), SEC Rule 10b-5,39 and the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984.40 Through this new legislation, the SEC gained the authority to bring
claims against controlling persons, create a bounty program for
whistleblowers, and cooperate with foreign governmental authorities.41 The
SEC’s authority to pay bounties to whistleblowers was codified by § 21A(e)
of the Exchange Act.42 Under the new law, the SEC could pay a reward to
“a person who provides information leading to the recovery of a civil
penalty from an insider trader, from a person who tipped information to an
insider trader, or from a person who directly or indirectly controlled an
insider trader.”43 The SEC was also granted the sole discretion to determine
whether to reward the whistleblower with a bounty.44 If the SEC decided to
grant a reward, it could not “exceed 10 percent of the amount recovered
from a civil penalty pursuant to a court order.”45

36. Shah, supra note 14, at 797–98. It is rumored that the Gordon Gecko character in Oliver
Stone’s movie Wall Street (Twentieth Century Fox 1987) was loosely based on Ivan Boesky.
Randy James, Insider Trading, TIME.COM (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/magazine
/article/0,9171,1938727,00.html.
37. See, e.g., Poll Finds Majority Thinks Insider Trading is Common, WALL ST. J., June 6,
1986, at 1.
38. Joo, supra note 30, at 583–84.
39. See Shah, supra note 14, at 793–95.
40. Joo, supra note 30, at 578–80. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act increased the penalty,
from $10,000 to $100,000, that the SEC could receive under the Exchange Act. Id. at 578.
41. Shah, supra note 14, at 798–99. The law also created duties for broker-dealers and
investment advisers to create programs to prevent insider trading. Additionally, criminal penalties
were increased, and private rights of action for those who engaged in trades with insider traders
were created. Id.
42. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 3,
102 Stat. 4677, 4679 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–1 (1988)) amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 923(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1849–50 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 78u–6 (2010)).
43. ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at ii.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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C. CRITIQUE OF THE SEC’S INSIDER TRADING BOUNTY PROGRAM
After the insider trading bounty program went into effect, the SEC
quickly received over twenty-five tips, several of which the “head of the
SEC’s enforcement division [described as] . . . ‘helpful, extremely
helpful.’”46 Within a couple of years, however, the optimism for the
program declined, and in 1992, the SEC Enforcement Director William
McLucas said that the program was unhelpful to SEC’s enforcement.47 He
argued that although the SEC received “a lot of nut letters,” it did little to
motivate true informants.48 To date, the SEC’s bounty program for
whistleblowers reporting insider trading has paid out just under $1.2 million
to six complainants, including a $1 million reward that was paid out in the
summer of 2010, right after the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law.49
In its most recent review of the program, the Office of Inspector
General of the SEC found that the Agency had received a small number of
requests from those seeking a reward.50 Additionally, the program was
unknown to many people, including SEC employees.51 The report also
found that the program was not user-friendly, and the SEC did not have a
uniform set of rules in place to determine when and in what amounts
bounties should be given.52 Lastly, the report revealed that the SEC did not
follow up with informants regarding their tips, and the files were often not
complete and were typically not tracked within the office.53 Overall, the
program was considered unsuccessful.54

46. Ferziger & Currell, supra note 32, at 1165 (citing Gregory A. Robb, SEC Backs Rewards
for Insider Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1989, at D1).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at 5 (discussing that $159,537 was paid through the SEC’s
insider trading program from its inception until March 2010). Gil Rudawsky, SEC Pays
Informants $1 Million in Insider-Trading Case, DAILYFINANCE.COM (July 23, 2010),
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/07/23/sec-pays-informants-1-million-in-insider-trading-case/.
The $1 million reward was paid in an insider trading case against Pequot Capital Management.
The case was stalled until Glen Kaiser and Karen Kaiser provided the SEC with emails from
Karen Kaiser’s ex-husband, David Zilkha. The emails implied that Zilkha, who was a Microsoft
employee who later accepted a job at Pequot, was providing Arthur Samberg, the Chief Executive
Officer of Pequot, with insider information about Microsoft. Samberg used information provided
by Zilkha to benefit Pequot. The emails from Karen Kaiser provided the link that the SEC was
missing. As a result, the case was settled by Pequot and Sambert for $17 million. Id.
50. ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at 4. Interestingly, Ferziger and Currell point out that even
without awarding bounties, the SEC still gets tips from informants. From 1985 to 1986, one-third
of enforcement actions brought by the SEC were initiated by informants. Ferziger & Currell,
supra note 32, at 1189.
51. ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at 4. See also Ferziger & Currell, supra note 32, at 1161.
52. ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at 4.
53. Id.
54. See id. See also Ferziger & Currell, supra note 32, at 1165.
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III. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
Section 806 of SOX created anti-retaliation provisions for employees of
a public company who report fraud to the SEC.55 As discussed below, SOX
and § 806 came about after the corporate scandals of 2000 and 2001.56 The
goal of § 806 was to encourage employees of public companies to report
information pertaining to fraud to the SEC by offering anti-retaliation
protections.57 Yet, some data shows that since SOX was enacted, the
number of employees who reported fraud to the SEC actually decreased.58
Additionally, many employee claims for retaliation under SOX failed.59
A. CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO THE CREATION OF THE LAW
During the mid-1990s, changes in communication and information
technology contributed to a growing economy, especially in the “dot.com”
industry.60 Nevertheless, “[s]tarting in the second quarter of 2000, the
bubble burst,” and the market rapidly declined.61 As stock prices
plummeted and the market unraveled, evidence of fraud at some wellknown public corporations was uncovered.62
Perhaps the most shocking case of corporate fraud to be uncovered
during this time occurred at Enron, “one of the fastest growing U.S.
corporations of the 1990s.”63 Enron used fraudulent accounting practices to
hide losses, and as a result, the stock price remained higher than it was
worth.64 Finally, in the third quarter of 2001, Enron reported a $618 million
loss,65 and by December 2001, the company filed for bankruptcy.66 As a
result, all of Enron’s employees lost their jobs and savings, and investors
55. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 (2002) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002)), amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 922(c)(1)(a)(i), 124 Stat. 1376, 1848 (2010) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2010)).
56. Earle & Madek, supra note 12; Ramirez, supra note 12, at 196–97.
57. See Kevin Rubinstein, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806:
Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 637, 638 (2007/08).
58. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 12, at 2250.
59. See generally Earle & Madek, supra note 12, at 20 (discussing whistleblower protection).
60. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Testimony before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing & Urban Affairs: Concerning Implementation of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (Sept.
9, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/090903tswhd.htm [hereinafter
Donaldson Testimony].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Ramirez, supra note 12, at 196.
64. Letter purportedly from Enron employee Sharron Watkins sent to Enron Chairman and
CEO Kenneth Lay regarding Enron accounting practices (Aug. 2001), available at
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/empltr2lay82001.pdf.
See
also
Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers, the Duty
of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 875, 875–76
(2002).
65. Baynes, supra note 64, at 880.
66. Id.
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lost large sums of money.67 Then, Sherron Watkins, an employee of Enron,
testified at the congressional hearings about the fraudulent accounting
practices used by the company and detailed the anonymous letter she wrote
to Enron’s Chief Executive Officer, warning him of the fraud.68 Watkins
became a national figure, and was named one of Time Magazine’s “Persons
of the Year [for] 2002” for her courage to “blow the whistle.”69
Within the next year, other large-scale corporate frauds came to light
including those at WorldCom, Adelphia, and Tyco.70 As a result of these
scandals, investor confidence decreased, and the markets dropped.71 As
Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Associate Professor of Law at Washburn University
School of Law, notes, “[b]y summer of 2002, the political and economic
context as well as political and economic interests demanded action.”72
Congress put its attention toward creating legislation to once again increase
confidence in the financial markets by improving financial reporting and
protections for whistleblowers.73 After receiving overwhelming support by
Congress, President George W. Bush signed SOX into law on July 30,
2002.74
B. SOX AND § 806 WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS
SOX is a comprehensive law that led to changes in corporate
responsibility, enhanced financial disclosures,75 and “expanded criminal
jurisdiction and penalties.”76 Additionally, § 806 bolstered protections for
employees of public companies who blow the whistle on corporate fraud.77
Pursuant to this section, an employer may not “discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in
the terms and conditions of employment” because the employee provided
the SEC with information that he reasonably thought to be fraudulent
67. Nicholson, supra note 15, at 322.
68. Baynes, supra note 64, at 877–78.
69. Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The Whistleblowers,
TIME.COM (Dec. 30, 2002), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1003998,00.html.
The article also named two other famed whistleblowers, Cynthia Cooper, who was an internal
auditor at WorldCom, and Colleen Rowley of the FBI. Id.
70. See Donaldson Testimony, supra note 60.
71. Federal Reserve’s Second Monetary Policy Report for 2002: Hearing Before the Comm.
on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 8 (2002) (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), available at http;//www.federalreserve
.gov/boarddocs/hh/2002/july.testimony.htm.
72. See Ramirez, supra note 12, at 196–97.
73. Earle & Madek, supra note 12, at 2–4.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Donaldson Testimony, supra note 60.
76. Ramirez, supra note 12, at 197.
77. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04 (2002) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002)), amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 922(c)(1)(a)(i), 124 Stat. 1376, 1848 (2010) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2010)).
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behavior by the employer.78 Under § 806, an employee who was adversely
treated by an employer only had “90 days after the date on which the
violation occur[ed]” to “fil[e] a complaint with the Secretary of Labor.”79
Since the law was enacted, the Department of Labor delegated the review of
such claims to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA).80 If the claimant does not receive a decision within 180 days, he or
she can bring the claim to a U.S. federal district court for de novo review.81
The remedy for such action can include reinstatement, back pay with
interest, and compensation for fees incurred because of the discrimination.82
C. CRITIQUE OF § 806 OF SOX
Initially, the whistleblower protections provided by § 806 of SOX were
praised.83 Within three years, however, many were criticizing the law for
not protecting whistleblowers as expected.84 In their study, Dyck, Morse,
and Zingales noticed that after SOX was enacted, although there was an
increase in fraud detection among auditors, as well as an increase in SEC
interventions,85 the rate of whistle-blowing by employees dropped from
18% to 13%.86 Furthermore, other studies found that very few of the
employees who filed claims for retaliation with the Department of Labor
had been successful.87
There have been a few reasons given as to why SOX did not encourage
or protect whistleblowers as expected.88 Some believe that the antiretaliation measures did not provide a strong enough incentive for people to
report fraud and risk their careers.89 Others have argued that the procedural
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Secretary’s Order 5-2002; Delegation of Authority and Assignment of Responsibility to
the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,008 (Oct. 22, 2002).
81. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806, 116 Stat. 803 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B)),
amended by Dodd-Frank Act § 922(c)(1)(a)(i), 124 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1514A(b)(2)(D)).
82. Id. § 803–04 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(C)) amended by Dodd-Frank Act
§ 922(c)(1)(a)(i), 124 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(b)(2)(D)).
83. See, e.g., Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 68 (2007).
84. Id. at 67; Jisoo Kim, Comment, Confessions of a Whistleblower: The Need to Reform the
Whistleblower Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 250–51
(2009).
85. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 12, at 2249–50.
86. Id. at 2250.
87. See Moberly, supra note 83, at 90–100; Earle & Madek, supra note 12, at 20–23.
88. See Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 12, at 2250–51 (suggesting that anti-retaliation
provisions of SOX should be enhanced by including financial incentives); Kim, supra note 84, at
251 (arguing that the ninety-day statute of limitations to bring an anti-retaliation claim was not a
long enough timeframe); Ramirez, supra note 12, at 211 (noting that “[p]ractitioners observe that
both the investigators and supervisors lack disposition, training, and experience to adequately
assess [SOX] claims because they are outside their area of competence”).
89. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 12, at 2250–51.
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requirements for anti-retaliation claims—especially the ninety-day statute
of limitations—were too stringent.90 Finally, some believe that OSHA’s
inexperience in assessing securities fraud claims91 made the process long
and at times, wasteful.92 Overall, § 806 of SOX has not received good
reviews.
IV. THE DODD-FRANK ACT OF 2010
A. CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING UP TO THE NEW LAW
Beginning in 2001, extremely low mortgage rates led to a “recordsetting level of home sales,” and there was a general improvement in the
economy.93 By 2005, the housing market was still strong, but signs of an
impending decline in the market were starting to surface.94 During the
second half of 2006, and throughout 2007, foreclosure rates soared.95 Many
of these foreclosures were on subprime mortgages,96 which had been
repackaged into mortgage-backed securities,97 causing the problem to
spread to the financial sector and credit markets.98 As a result, Lehman
Brothers and American International Group, two of Wall Street’s best
known and oldest institutions, went bankrupt in September 2008.99 Upon
90. See Kim, supra note 84, at 251.
91. Id. at 253–54. In order to determine whether the retaliation claim is valid, OSHA has to
first determine whether the employee had a reasonable belief that the employer was committing
fraud, which requires a thorough understanding of securities fraud. Id. See also Ramirez, supra
note 12, at 210–11.
92. Kim, supra note 84, at 253–54.
93. See Kathleen Madigan with Christopher Palmieri, Ann Therese Palmer & Dean Foust,
After the Housing Boom: What the Coming Slowdown Means for the Economy – and You,
BUSINESS WEEK, Apr. 11, 2005, at 78–86; Ryan Barnes, The Fuel that Fed the Subprime
Meltdown, INVESTOPEDIA.COM (Sept. 4, 2007), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07
/subprime-overview.asp#axzz1WeUpdh2T.
94. See Madigan et al., supra note 93.
95. See Barnes, supra note 93.
96. Subprime loans carry a higher rate of interest than prime loans, and are often issued to
borrowers with less than ideal credit histories in order to compensate for the higher risk of default.
Subprime Lending, DEPT. OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=
/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/lending/subprime (last visited Aug. 31, 2011).
97. Mortgage-backed securities have been defined as:
[D]ebt obligations that represent claims to the cash flows from pools of mortgage loans,
most commonly on residential property. Mortgage loans are purchased from banks,
mortgage companies, and other originators and then assembled into pools by a
governmental, quasi-governmental, or private entity. The entity then issues securities
that represent claims on the principal and interest payments made by borrowers on the
loans in the pool, a process known as securitization.
Mortgage-Backed Securities, SEC, http:www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last
modified July 23, 2010).
98. See Housing Woes Take Bigger Toll on Economy than Expected: Paulson, AFP (Oct. 16,
2007), http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hWSjWmGJ4YXTh3PM5kOC7csTT48g.
99. See Robert Gavin, Historic Bailout, Looming Questions; Can America Afford It? Some See
Cost Over $1 Trillion; Others Predict Much Less, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21, 2008, at A.1.
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learning of these bankruptcies, other financial firms became weary of
lending to one another, bringing the credit markets to a near halt.100 To get
the credit and financial markets back to normal, the federal government
bought around $700 billion of the troubled mortgage securities.101
Like the recessions previously mentioned, during this most recent
recession, many frauds were revealed.102 Bernie Madoff was arrested on
December 11, 2008,103 a day after he confessed to his sons that he had been
running a massive Ponzi scheme for years.104 Six months later, Allen
Stanford, a well-known Texas financier, was also arrested for allegedly
running an $8 billion fraud that consisted of selling certificates of deposit
through his Antiguan bank.105 Investors were told that their money was
placed in financial instruments monitored by twenty analysts and audited by
the Antiguan regulators; however, the money was put in a portfolio that was
managed by Stanford and the Chief Financial Officer of the company.106
The portfolio invested mainly in private equity and real estate.107
When people began to feel the effects of the subprime mortgage crisis
throughout the country, and news of these frauds spread, the American
public was once again anxious and angry.108 Congress held hearings
regarding the financial crisis109 and Madoff’s Ponzi scheme,110 as many
called for reform of the financial markets and the SEC.111 As a result, the
Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010,
with the intent of providing financial stability to the capital markets.112
B. THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND § 922 WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act expands the previous whistleblower
protections and incentives for those who report corporate or securities fraud
to the SEC.113 Under the new law, whistleblowers who provide the SEC
with “original information” that leads to a recovery exceeding $1 million
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See id.
See id.
See Madoff Hearing, supra note 4, at 2.
United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244, 244 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
See Efrati et al., supra note 3.
See Laurel Brubaker Calkins & Andrew M. Harris, Stanford Arrested by FBI Outside
Girlfriend’s Home (Update 3), BLOOMBERG, June 19, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com
/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=arjf3pKnYGx8.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See Top Bankers Face Grilling by Dubious Congress, MSNBC.COM (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29134559/ns/business-economy_at_a_crossroads.
109. See id.
110. See generally Madoff Hearing, supra note 4.
111. See Timothy Geithner & Lawrence Summers, A New Financial Foundation, WASH. POST,
June 15, 2009, at A.15.
112. Remarks, supra note 10.
113. Dodd-Frank Act , Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (2010) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78u–6 (2010)).

2011]

Whistleblower Incentives & Expanded Protections

199

can receive a reward of 10–30 percent of the recovery.114 The law defines
“original information” as information that:
(A) is derived from the independent knowledge or analysis of a
whistleblower; (B) is not known to the [SEC] from any other source,
unless the whistleblower is the original source of the information; and (C)
is not exclusively derived from an allegation made in a judicial or
administrative hearing, in a governmental report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or from the news media, unless the whistleblower is a
source of the information.115

The SEC has the sole discretion of how much the whistleblower should
receive116 depending on the information provided,117 the degree of help
provided by the whistleblower,118 the SEC’s interest in deterring violations
of securities law,119 and any other relevant information the SEC decides to
establish.120 A whistleblower may appeal the SEC’s decision to not grant an
award to a U.S. court of appeals within thirty days after the SEC issues its
decision.121
If the whistleblower anonymously submits information and
anonymously makes a claim for a reward, he or she must be represented by
an attorney.122 Before the reward is given, however, a whistleblower must
disclose his identity and any other information necessary to the SEC.123 All
rewards will be paid from the Investor Protection Fund,124 which has been
established in the U.S. Treasury.125
In addition to the financial incentives, the new law also strengthens the
anti-retaliation provisions of SOX.126 An employee who believes he or she
has been retaliated against can bring the suit straight to a U.S. district
court.127 Additionally, the statute of limitations to bring a claim is now six
years from the date of the violation,128 or three years after the employee
knew or should have known the material facts relating to the violation.129
Any member of the SEC, a relevant regulatory agency, the Department
of Justice, a self-regulatory organization, the Public Company Accounting
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. § 922(a)(1) & (b)(1).
Id. § 922(a)(3).
Id. § 922(c)(1)(A).
Id. § 922(c)(1)(B)(i)(I).
Id. § 922(c)(1)(B)(i)(II).
Id. § 922(c)(1)(B)(i)(III).
Id. § 922(c)(1)(B)(i)(IV).
Id. § 922(f).
Id. § 922(d)(2)(A).
Id. § 922(d)(2)(B).
Id. § 922(g)(2)(A).
Id. § 922(g)(1).
Id. § 922(h)(1).
Id. § 922(h)(1)(B)(i).
Id. § 922(h)(1)(B)(iii)(1)(aa).
Id. § 922(h)(1)(B)(iii)(1)(bb).
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Oversight Board, or a law enforcement organization is not eligible for the
reward.130 Additionally, a person who is convicted of a crime in relation to
the tip given is ineligible for a reward.131 Furthermore, a whistleblower who
knowingly and willfully provides false information to the SEC will not
receive the reward.132
Finally, the new law also requires the SEC to submit a report to the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the House
of Representatives Committee on Financial Services regarding the
whistleblower program.133 The report must include how many awards were
granted and the types of cases for which the awards were granted for each
year,134 among other disclosures.135 As a result of the new whistleblower
provisions, the insider trading bounty program has been rescinded.136
V. REACTIVE ENFORCEMENT
As demonstrated above, the pattern seems to be that when a recession
occurs, fraud is uncovered,137 which costs investors and angers the general
public.138 Reform is usually demanded, and Congress answers with more
legislation,139 which has included programs to incentivize and protect
whistleblowers of insider trading and corporate and securities fraud.140
When the market improves, however, the government and regulators seem
to become more complacent and often fail at protecting investors.141 Adam
Pritchard, Professor at the University of Michigan Law School, has noted
that “[t]his political cycling between policies of benign neglect and
hysterical overreaction suggests that the SEC, far from serving as a shelter

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. § 922(c)(2)(A).
Id. § 922(c)(2)(B).
Id. § 922(c)(2)(D).
Id. § 922(g)(5).
Id. § 922(g)(5)(A).
The report must also include information regarding the Investor Protection Fund, created
by the Dodd-Frank Act and used to fund the activities of the Inspector General of the SEC and pay
out whistleblower rewards. Id. § 922(g)(5)(B)–(G).
136. Rescission of Rules Pertaining to the Payment of Bounties for Information Leading to the
Recovery of Civil Penalties for Insider Trading, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,384 (Sept. 21, 2010) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201).
137. See A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time For Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073,
1078 (2005); see also Madoff Hearing, supra note 4, at 2.
138. See Pritchard, supra note 137, at 1078. See also Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory
Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1,
10–11 (2002).
139. See Pritchard, supra note 137, at 1078; see also Ribstein, supra note 138, at 11.
140. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,
§ 3, 102 Stat. 4677, 4679 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–1 (1988)) amended by Dodd-Frank Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 923(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1849–50 (2010) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78u–6 (2010)); Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04
(2002) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002)).
141. See Pritchard, supra note 137, at 1078.
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against the vagaries of the political winds, acts more like a weathervane,
swinging wildly with change in the political atmosphere.”142
Pritchard believes that the SEC, because of its status as an independent
agency, is very susceptible “to the political whims of [Congress],” leading
to less effective policies.143 Additionally, both Stephen Choi, Professor of
Law at New York University Law School, and Pritchard note that reactive
regulation is not only subjected to political opportunism, but is also subject
to “[a]vailability and [h]indsight [b]iases.”144 In other words, both Congress
and the SEC rely too heavily on recent events, and “place too much weight
on the probability of past events that actually occurred relative to those that
did not.”145 Therefore, legislating in reaction to a crisis is not the ideal.146
Reactive legislation leads to ineffective, and at times, costly policy
changes.147
VI. WERE THE NEW FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND EXPANDED
ANTI-RETALIATION PROTECTIONS FOR
WHISTLEBLOWERS NECESSARY?
The new whistleblower provisions are very broad, but it seems that
Congress has incorporated into the law what many believed was lacking in
the prior programs.148 First, the new program offers a large financial
incentive for any type of corporate or securities fraud reported that leads to
at least a $1 million fine.149 This is an expansion of the insider trading
bounty program and requires that the minimum reward be 10 percent of the
recovery,150 as compared to the previous maximum of 10 percent.151
Additionally, the new anti-retaliation provisions include a longer statute of
limitations, which can now be filed directly in federal court, rather than
with OSHA.152 Because of the increase in incentive to report and protection
after reporting, the SEC has reported that many tips have already been
142. Id. at 1083. See also Joan MacLeod Heminway, Reframing and Reforming the Securities
and Exchange Commission: Lessons from Literature on Change Leadership, 55 VILL. L. REV.
627, 627 (2010).
143. Pritchard, supra note 137, at 1076.
144. Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public Offerings, 10 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 85, 123 (2006).
145. Pritchard, supra note 137, at 1079.
146. Id. at 1081. See also Heminway, supra note 142, at 627.
147. See Pritchard, supra note 137, at 1081. See also Heminway, supra note 142, at 627.
148. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (2010)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6 (2010)); Feldman & Lobel, supra note 27; Dyck, Morse &
Zingales, supra note 12, at 2251; Earle & Madek, supra note 12; Ramirez, supra note 12, at 208–
13, 217–18.
149. Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. 1841–49 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6).
150. Id.
151. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 3,
102 Stat. 4677, 4679 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–1 (1988)) amended by Dodd-Frank Act
§ 923(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1849–50 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6).
152. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(c)(1)(A)(i), 124 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514(b)(3)(D)).
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received.153 Therefore, the new whistleblower provisions seem to address
the criticism that previous laws were not broad enough. But were they
actually necessary?
It has been suggested that previous whistleblower laws did not offer
enough incentives and anti-retaliation protections for people to come
forward with information.154 Yet, prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank
Act, it was not unusual for the SEC to receive about 1,000 tips from
informants per day.155 Although many of these tips were frivolous, some
were not. People were willing to report fraud without financial incentives
from the SEC.156 Specifically, Markopolos gave a twenty-one page detailed
account of why Madoff was likely conducting a Ponzi scheme.157 He said
that he gave the SEC all they needed to know, but the Agency ignored
him.158 Although Markopolos’s information spurred an investigation, the
SEC investigators concluded that Madoff’s business was legitimate.159
Likewise, the SEC had leads regarding Stanford’s Ponzi scheme, but did
not investigate them thoroughly.160 Therefore, it seems like the failure to
catch these frauds did not lie with the lack of tips received by the SEC, but
rather with the SEC itself.161
A. PROBLEMS WITHIN THE SEC
Over the past few years there have been articles written describing
internal problems of the SEC that hinder its ability to detect fraud.162 Some
believe that the SEC is too influenced by the financial industry. 163 Others
believe that the SEC failed to detect fraud because it was lacking good
procedures and experienced investigators.164 Yet some, including the SEC
itself, believe that the Agency’s failures are due to underfunding and
153. See Jessica Holzer & Fawn Johnson, Larger Bounties Spur Surge in Fraud Tips, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 7, 2010, at C.3.
154. See Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 12, at 2250–51; Earle & Madek, supra note 12;
Ramirez, supra note 12, at 219–20.
155. Bruce Carton, Details Emerge on SEC Office of Market Intelligence,
COMPLIANCEWEEK.COM (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.complianceweek.com/Article/5789/detailsemerge-on-sec-office-of-market-intelligence.
156. Id.
157. Madoff Hearing, supra note 4, at 116.
158. See id. at 5.
159. See H.R., COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, MINORITY STAFF REPORT-THE SEC:
DESIGNED FOR FAILURE 5 (2010) [hereinafter MINORITY STAFF REPORT].
160. See SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, No. OIG-526, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEC’S
RESPONSE TO CONCERNS REGARDING ROBERT ALLEN STANFORD’S ALLEGED PONZI SCHEME 1
(2010) [hereinafter STANFORD INVESTIGATION].
161. See MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 159, at 1–2.
162. See Heminway, supra note 142, at 627–28; Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The
SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785, 785–86 (2009); Pritchard, supra note 137, at 1077–92.
163. See Pritchard, supra note 137, at 1089–91.
164. See Madoff Hearing, supra note 4, at 5. See MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 159, at
5–6.
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understaffing.165 Finally, others believe that the SEC’s lack of technology
for reviewing all the data it receives has contributed to its inability to detect
fraud.166
1. Regulatory Capture
Regulatory capture occurs when a regulatory agency that was created to
act in the public’s interest begins to act in ways that are more beneficial to
the industry it is supposed to be regulating.167 Despite being an independent
agency, there is evidence that the SEC has been influenced by industry
lobbyists, especially during a bull market.168 Pritchard argues that this
influence has led to regulations which benefit the bigger players and names
in the securities markets.169 In addition to being influenced by the industry
through the political process, there has been a revolving door between the
Agency and the private sector, as many people who worked for the SEC
have left to work in the private financial industry.170
Evidence of this regulatory capture can be seen in both the Madoff and
Stanford cases. There have been suggestions that the SEC did not
thoroughly investigate Madoff because of his prominence in the industry.171
Additionally, the SEC’s Inspector General’s report on Stanford revealed
that although examiners found red flags and suggested opening an
investigation, top officials decided to stop investigating Stanford on
numerous occasions.172 A head enforcement agent that was instrumental in
those decisions later left the Agency and tried to represent Stanford three
times.173 Therefore, it seems that interactions between the SEC’s employees
and those in the private financial sector can at times inhibit the Agency’s
ability to detect fraud.
2. Procedural and Policy Problems
Prior to the SEC reforms that began in early 2010, the SEC did not have
a streamlined system in place for receiving and investigating tips.174
Because of this disarrayed system and the increasing number of tips the
Agency was receiving, it was harder for the Agency to distinguish the

165. See MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 159, at 18; Michael Schroeder, SEC Gets a
Raise, But Will It Be Enough?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2002, at C.1.
166. See MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 159, at 11–14.
167. See generally Pritchard, supra note 137, at 1079–92.
168. Id. at 1090.
169. Id. at 1089–92.
170. Tom McGinty, SEC ‘Revolving Door’ Under Review – Staffers Who Join Companies They
Once Regulated Draw Lawmakers’ Ire; Ms. King and Getco, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2010, at C.1.
171. Madoff Hearing, supra note 4, at 7.
172. STANFORD INVESTIGATION, supra note 160, at 16.
173. Id. at 27.
174. See Carton, supra note 155.
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legitimate from the frivolous.175 Furthermore, the SEC had a policy that
evaluated the enforcement division by the number of cases it filed rather
than the quality and complexity of the fraud it detected.176
When the SEC’s Inspector General conducted an investigation of the
SEC’s Division of Enforcement and its failure to detect Madoff’s Ponzi
scheme, it found many systematic issues related to the lack of guidance on
how to properly and completely analyze tips.177 Additionally, the Inspector
General’s report on Stanford found that top SEC officials in the Agency’s
Fort Worth office often avoided complex cases, like Stanford, and instead
focused on smaller and easier cases.178 This was done to improve their
“stats” since the heads of the Agency in Washington judged the regional
offices by the number of cases brought.179 As a result, the Agency’s lack of
review procedures for tips, as well as its focus on the quantity rather than
the complexity of cases, has played a role in its failure to detect the Madoff
and Stanford frauds.
3. Lack of Experienced Employees Who Understand Capital
Markets
The SEC has been criticized for being dominated by lawyers.180
Although lawyers are necessary to interpret and enforce securities laws and
the SEC rules, lawyers tend to be bad managers.181 Poor management was
one of the reasons that the SEC failed to detect Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.182
Additionally, lawyers often do not have a strong financial industry
background.183 As financial instruments become more complex, so does
investigating for fraud; therefore, those with expertise in the financial
markets might prove to be better at fraud detection.184 Furthermore, in his
report regarding the SEC’s failure to uncover Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, the
SEC’s Inspector General noted that the SEC’s examinations of Madoff’s
business were often conducted by teams of inexperienced staff members.185
Specifically, the report says that the inexperienced staff during one
examination “failed to appreciate the significance of the evidence in
[Markopolos’s] complaint,” and they were “confused about certain critical

175. See id.
176. See STANFORD INVESTIGATION, supra note 160, at 17.
177. See SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, No.OIG-509, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF
THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME, 20–42 (2009) [hereinafter MADOFF
INVESTIGATION].
178. See STANFORD INVESTIGATION, supra note 160, at 17.
179. See id.
180. See MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 159, at 1.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 159, at 1; Madoff Hearing, supra note 4, at 14.
184. See Madoff Hearing, supra note 4, at 14.
185. See MADOFF INVESTIGATION, supra note 177, at 23–24, 36, 237–46.
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and fundamental aspects of Madoff’s operation.”186 It will be very difficult,
and even impossible, for people to detect fraud if they do not have a basic
understanding of the business models and industry that they are
investigating.187
4. Understaffed and Underfunded
Another problem, usually cited by the SEC, is that the Agency has been
understaffed and underfunded.188 Some refute this argument noting that the
SEC’s budget has tripled between 2000 and 2010, and yet its problems
remain.189 Without enough financial resources, the SEC cannot hire as
many people as necessary to regulate the growing financial industry.190
Additionally, it has trouble retaining more experienced people, as many of
its employees often leave to go work in the private sector where the salaries
are better.191
5. Lack of Technology
The SEC collects a great amount of disclosure data from companies in
order to make sure the companies are complying with the law and not
defrauding investors.192 While the amount of information received by the
SEC has increased in recent years, the Agency’s information technology
has not improved to meet the Agency’s needs.193 Although many in the
private sector use risk-monitoring software to screen documents for errors,
note year-to-year changes, and calculate important financial ratios, the SEC
employs many people to review documents manually.194 This is a timely
procedure, and as a result, the SEC does not have the ability to do an
industry-wide data analysis.195 Accordingly, the SEC has become reliant on
external sources such as tips, complaints, and news stories.196 As mentioned
above, however, the process for reviewing tips has also been problematic.197

186. Id. at 24.
187. See MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 159, at 1; STANFORD INVESTIGATION, supra
note 160, at 16.
188. Schroeder, supra note 165.
189. See MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 159, at 1.
190. Schroeder, supra note 165.
191. See McGinty, supra note 170; Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, Op-Ed, How to Repair a
Broken Financial World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at WK.10.
192. See MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 159, at 11–12.
193. See id. at 12.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 13.
196. See id.
197. See Carton, supra note 155.
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B. DO THE NEW WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS ADDRESS THE
AFOREMENTIONED PROBLEMS?
It seems that the reason the SEC was unable to detect Madoff’s and
Stanford’s Ponzi schemes was due to policy and operations problems within
the Agency, and not because the Agency lacked information and tips
regarding the fraud. The SEC was already undergoing internal reforms,
setting better procedures for investigating tips, and training employees.198
Why then, would the SEC and Congress create a whistleblower program
that offers very high financial incentives and anti-retaliation protections? It
seems that it might have been another instance of Congress feeling that it
must do something in the face of public anger.199
Although the new financial incentives may increase the number of tips
the SEC receives,200 there is no guarantee that they will receive quality
information.201 The increase in tips may overwhelm the SEC, as more
resources will have to be expended on sifting through the increasing
number of claims and trying to determine which are legitimate.202 Also,
before the financial incentives were offered, those who reviewed tips in the
Agency were sometimes skeptical of the information.203 Now that there are
financial incentives, this skepticism may heighten. As has happened in the
past at the SEC, more tips may prove to be a burden rather than helpful
information.204
VII. A MORE PRUDENT AND PROACTIVE APPROACH
Reforms were undoubtedly needed within the SEC’s Division of
Enforcement, especially in relation to the investigation of whistleblower

198. See SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, No.467, PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED
WITHIN THE SEC’S DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT 3 (2009) [hereinafter PROGRAM
IMPROVEMENTS].
199. See Heminway, supra note 142, at 628; Pritchard, supra note 137, at 1078; Ribstein, supra
note 138, at 11.
200. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 27, at 1202; Bruce Carton, Pitfalls Emerge in DoddFrank Bounty Provision, SECURITIESDOCKET.com (Sept. 9, 2010, 3:37 PM), http://www
.securitiesdocket.com/2010/09/09/pitfalls-emerge-in-dodd-frank-whistleblower-bounty-provision/;
Holzer & Johnson, supra note 153 (noting a surge in fraud tips made to the SEC in the months
after the Dodd-Frank Act was passed).
201. See Ferziger & Currell, supra note 32, at 1165 (discussing how the Insider Trading Bounty
Program was promising, but ultimately attracted mainly frivolous tips); Holzer & Johnson, supra
note 153 (noting that Stephen Cohen, an SEC official, states that the SEC has received “very highquality tips” in the months following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, but also noting concerns
that the new whistleblower program will cause frivolous cases).
202. See Carton, supra note 200.
203. See MADOFF INVESTIGATION, supra note 177, at 36 (noting that the enforcement staff
dismissed Markopolos’s tip because he was a competitor of Madoff and they thought he “was
looking for a bounty”).
204. See Ferziger & Currell, supra note 32, at 1165.
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complaints.205 Yet, rather than creating large financial incentives and antiretaliation provisions for whistleblowers, the SEC should have focused on
making smaller, internal changes. Additionally, the SEC should consider
taking a more proactive approach by enhancing its information technology,
creating a database of all the information it receives from companies, and
conducting industry-wide data analyses rather than increasing its reliance
on whistleblowers to provide the Agency with leads.206
A. PRUDENT REFORMS REGARDING WHISTLEBLOWER TIPS
The SEC recognized the need to make internal changes before the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.207 In January 2010, the Agency announced
it would be creating an Office of Market Inspection within the Division of
Enforcement, which would deal solely with investigating the hundreds of
thousands of tips the Agency receives each year.208 Perhaps it would have
been better to give the SEC time to get the new office and procedures in
place before offering financial incentives that could greatly increase the
amount of tips received.
Furthermore, the SEC should have been given the power to pay
bounties to whistleblowers who provide information that leads to successful
enforcement. Rather than creating a new mandatory payment of 10–30
percent of a settlement, perhaps the Insider Trading Bounty Program, which
gave the SEC discretion to reward an informant up to 10 percent of a
settlement,209 could have been extended to all informants. Although this
program has been considered a failure, its failure seemed to be due to the
fact that very few people knew about it and that the SEC rarely rewarded
informants.210 Therefore, the SEC could address these problems by
publicizing the reward program and rewarding informants when they
provided helpful information. Additionally, requiring an annual report on
the program from the SEC to congressional committees, as the Dodd-Frank
Act does, 211 is a good way for Congress to make sure that the program is
being utilized.

205. See MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 159, at 5–7 (discussing the failure of the SEC to
properly investigate complaints against Madoff); STANFORD INVESTIGATION, supra note 160, at
16 (discussing the failure of the SEC to properly investigate complaints against Stanford);
ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at iii (noting the SEC’s weaknesses in reviewing tips pursuant to the
Insider Trading Bounty Program).
206. See MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 159, at 13–14.
207. See PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 198, at 3.
208. See Carton, supra note 155.
209. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 3,
102 Stat. 4677, 4679 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–1 (1988)) amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 923(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1849–50 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 78u–6 (2010)).
210. See ASSESSMENT, supra note 32 , at 6–7.
211. Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. 1845 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6).
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Moreover, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement should try to attract
employees who are experienced with investigating securities fraud,212 and
who have knowledge of the capital markets.213 Competitive salaries will
help attract employees of high caliber, and may even help close the
revolving door between the Agency and the financial industry.214 This
would make the Agency more independent and less susceptible to industry
capture.215 Likewise, the Agency should offer incentive bonuses to those in
the Division of Enforcement when they are instrumental in detecting fraud
and getting a settlement.216
B. A MORE PROACTIVE APPROACH
While whistleblowers undoubtedly play an important part in detecting
fraud,217 the SEC should not become too reliant on tips from outsiders.218
The Agency should try to implement more proactive measures for detecting
fraud.219 The SEC should update its information technology and streamline
its systems so that all of the regional offices have access to the same
information.220 Additionally, the SEC should use software to scan
documents for errors and create a database for all the information they
receive, which would give them the ability to do industry-wide data
analyses.221 Although technology is not infallible, having these systems in
place would make the review process quicker and better enable the SEC to
detect trends and anomalies in the market.222 The Agency should also create
risk profiles based on the elements that previous schemes had in
common.223 These technological updates may lessen the SEC’s need to rely
on outside informants.224 Even if these changes do not lessen the SEC’s
reliance on tips, these technological enhancements will still be beneficial
because the data they produce can help the Agency prioritize and review
tips that it receives.225

212. See MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 159, at 1; MADOFF INVESTIGATION, supra note
177, at 36 (noting that the person who was assigned to investigate Markopolos’s tip had no
experience with Ponzi scheme investigations).
213. See MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 159, at 1; Madoff Hearing, supra note 4, at 14.
214. See McGinty, supra note 170; Schroeder, supra note 165.
215. See McGinty, supra note 170.
216. See Madoff Hearing, supra note 4, at 33.
217. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 27; Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 12, at 2214.
218. See MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 159, at 14.
219. See id. at 11.
220. See id. at 13–14.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 14.
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CONCLUSION
The new whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act offer great
financial incentives and anti-retaliation protections to those who provide
tips about corporate and securities fraud to the SEC. Although the new law
sounds good in theory, it might have been unnecessary. The SEC missed
Madoff’s fraud not because it did not receive enough tips, but rather
because they failed to properly investigate the tips they did receive.
Therefore, a law that can potentially lead to a great increase in claims, many
of which might be frivolous, will only make the SEC’s task more onerous.
A more prudent reform that focused on improving the SEC’s internal
procedures and technology for reviewing tips would have been a better
approach. Improving internal procedures and technology will not only help
the SEC review tips, but will also enable the Agency to become less
dependent on informants and more proactive and independent in detecting
fraud.
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